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ABSTRACT
In an attempt to boost consumer spending and reinvigorate the
national economy following the 1997-98 South Korean financial
crisis, the South Korean government encouraged consumer credit
card usage. However, the South Korean government did not
foresee the ensuing consumer credit card crisis caused by
consumers spending much more than their actual earnings. As a
result, the world's eleventh largest economy was heavily weighed
down by debt-ridden individuals, totaling at one point nearly ten
percent of the entire South Korean population, with the potential
to trigger another financial crisis in the Asia-Pacific region.
The government's response came in the form of the Individual
Debtor Rehabilitation Act (IDRA), which was passed by the South
Korean National Assembly on March 2, 2004 and became
effective as of September 23, 2004.' The intent of IDRA is to
provide individual debt claim relief to qualified debtors.2 IDRA
effectively provides a rehabilitation program for individual debtors
who have income, but are still at risk of individual bankruptcy.
Eligibility is limited to those who will receive a reliable and
continuous source of future income through some form of
employment. This paper discusses IDRA's approach to resolving
South Korea's post-1997 consumer spending hangover.
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I. Introduction
A. Paper Methodology
This paper consists of three major components. The
introduction describes the circumstances surrounding the post-
1997 South Korean credit card spending hangover. The second
part provides a broad overview and discussion relating to IDRA
and its stated objectives. Finally, part three analyzes IDRA from a
policy perspective.
B. Existing Academic Literature
No literature currently exists that covers individual credit
defaulters from a legal and legislative purview within the South
Korean context in the post-1997 period. Most existing research
separates the two related problems of credit default and credit card
corporation delinquency, with the majority focusing on the latter
issue of credit card corporation delinquency as it relates to South
Korean macroeconomic growth. For example, Gon Pil Choi
discusses the credit defaulter issue and argues that the credit card
companies' rampant issuance of credit cards did not constitute
sound economic policy to stimulate macroeconomic growth.3
Although Choi discusses several government countermeasure
policies, the paper merely provides a general overview of each act
3 See generally GON PIL CHOI, KOREA INST. OF FIN., SHINYONG BUHLANGJAH
KEUPJEUNGEUH WONINGWAH DEHCHEK, [CAUSE OF CREDIT DEFAULTERS AND ITS
COUNTERMEASURES] (2004).
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and does not focus on the legal issues within such acts. Similarly,
the Korea Institute of Finance released a paper analyzing Korean
government policy relating to credit card defaulters, which argued
for greater use of revolving credit card lines-which are common
in the United States but currently not widely adopted in South
Korea-and other related structural reforms. 4
Other papers were published in the pre-1997 period and thus
are dated, such as Professor Dong-Ki Kim's paper,5 which
provides a comprehensive non-legal overview of South Korean
credit card policy and notes that almost no academic literature
exists for the post-1997 period.6 Finally, Professor Soo-Geun Oh
discusses IDRA, but only in the context of a practical guide for
interested credit defaulters who are seeking IDRA protection.
This paper attempts to fill this void in the literature in the hope
that it will be beneficial to both the academic and financial
community, which may seek greater clarity as to how IDRA may
impact the South Korean markets.8
South Korea is a nation of massive credit card defaulters.9
4 See generally Korea Instit. of Fin., Confronting Strategy for the Credit Defaulter
Problem, 13 KOREAN ECON. & FIN. OUTLOOK 8 (2004).
5 See generally DONG-KI KIM, WOORi NARA SHINYONG KADU JEUNGCHEKEH
GWANHAN YUNGU: KEU MEUNJEH JUNGGWAH GEHSUHNBANGAHNEUL JOONGSHIMEUROH
[RESEARCH ON KOREAN CREDIT CARD POLICY: ITS PROBLEMS AND PLANS FOR
REFORMATION] (1992).
6 Id.
7 See generally Soo-Geun Oh, ALGEEH SHEEWON GEIN HWEH SENG JULCHA [EASY
UNDERSTANDING OF THE IDRA PROCESS] (2004).
8 In particular, there exists significant interest from global investment banks based
in the Asia-Pacific region that cover the South Korean markets. Specifically, such
interest is in part focused on the Korean consumer non-performing loan (NPL) market.
If IDRA effectively cures South Korea's creditor delinquency problem, then the NPL
pool size may be less than if IDRA is ineffective legislation that will not significantly
curb the growing number of consumer defaults in South Korea. Often global investment
banks, such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Lehman Brothers,
purchase such NPLs to use as collateral for the issuance of high yielding asset-backed
securities (ABS) vis- -vis the use of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as an issuer
domiciled in a tax-efficient jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands, Labuan, or
Bermuda. See Dominic O'Kane, Structured Credit Research, Credit Derivatives
Explained: Markets, Products, and Regulations, March 2001, Lehman Brothers
International (Europe), at 35-37; KAMCO website, at http://www.aplbiz.com/eng
/intro/summary/awards.j sp.
9 For purposes of this paper, "South Korea," "ROK," and "Korea" (and any
derivation thereof) shall, each and collectively, refer to the Republic of Korea.
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Nearly ten percent of the entire Korean population, or nearly four
million individuals, have defaulted on their personal credit card
debts or loans with little indication of improving conditions.° The
transformation is remarkable. A mere eight years ago, in the wake
of the 1997-98 Korean financial crisis (1997-98 Crisis), Korean
households were largely debt free." But now Korean households
hold an average household debt amount of approximately
US$27,000.12
The introduction of consumer credit cards by the Korean
government following the 1997-98 Crisis was the first of two
proposed solutions to boost domestic consumer spending. The
first government initiative provided incentives for consumers to
use credit cards, such as a twenty percent income tax deduction for
those whose credit card expenditures totaled more than ten percent
of his or her annual income. 3 The second government initiative
provided deregulatory incentives to consumer credit card issuing
institutions, including the lifting of long-held restrictions against
cash advances. "
Following the post-1997-98 Crisis, national policy helped
banks and credit lending institutions. 5 Such groups sought to
benefit from credit card use mostly through credit card interest
rates, which generally range from twenty to twenty-five percent in
South Korea. 16 Moreover, Korean credit cards generally do not
offer "revolving credit," such as is common in the United States.
The practical effect is that Korean consumers must pay off any
charged amount by the next monthly payment period, which
furthers debtor delinquency.
The lack of consumer spending is a ramification of the 1997-
98 Crisis that continues to adversely affect South Korea's
economy. The reason for this is twofold. First, many Koreans
10 See John Larkin, The House of Cards, TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, available at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501031208-552170,00.html.
'1 See David Schofield, Korea: Behind the Crisis in South Korea's Economy, ASIA
TIMES, July 20, 2004, available at http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FG20Dg04.html.
12 Id.
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saw their purchasing power drop substantially during the 1997-98
Crisis, which directly translated into fewer consumer purchases.
Second, during the 1997-98 Crisis, many Korean industries were
forced into bankruptcy, which increased unemployment rates and
dramatically deflated consumer confidence.17 Therefore, after the
1997-98 Crisis, consumers generally chose not to spend when
faced with a decision between spending now and not spending at
all. However, consumer spending behavior dramatically changed
from the beginning of the 1999 government promotion of the
individual use of credit cards in an effort to spur domestic
consumer spending. Individuals spent money on credit in a far
greater proportion than ever imagined by policymakers and credit-
lending institutions. This ultimately led to binge credit spending
and a notable spending spree hangover in the form of credit
repayment delinquencies and debtor defaults.
C. Credit Card Spending Binge
At times, the success of a government initiative is just as
detrimental as the failure of such an initiative. A case in point is
the Korean government's credit card initiative following the 1997-
98 Crisis. In 1997-98, the problem was that consumer spending
was too sluggish to revive the domestic economy. After 1999 the
solution to boost consumer spending was a series of disparate and
often uncoordinated government initiatives to promote the mass
issuance of credit cards to individuals. 8 The notable result was
that offering credit cards to boost consumer spending brought
about another unforeseen problem in the form of a post credit card
spending binge hangover. This occurred not because the government
plan to promote credit card usage was not successful enough, but
rather because the credit card initiative was overly successful.
17 Schofield, supra note 11.
18 For a paper focusing more on firm level credit problems, see Eduardo
Borensztein & Jung-Wha Lee, Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: Evidence
from Firm Level Data 5, 9 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 2000) (arguing that
following the 1997-98 Crisis, credit was reallocated away from large Korean
conglomerates (chaebol) to more "efficient" firms). For a more political economic
perspective on the Korean 1997-98 Crisis, see generally STEPHAN HAGGARD & JONGRYN
Mo, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 197-218 (2000)
(arguing that the 1997-98 Crisis was caused by: (1) a greater liberalization between state
and business; and (2) a timing conundrum in which the crisis occurred at an election
year, which may have added both to the depth and severity of the 1997-98 Crisis).
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Evidence of excessive credit card spending existed in various
forms. For example, just a mere three years after the
government's 1999 credit card initiative, Koreans quickly went
from having very few or no credit cards to having an average of
nearly four credit cards per person. 9 Such added lines of credit
quickly translated into increased consumer spending and gross
domestic output. Furthermore, South Korean economic output in
1999 was an extremely robust 10.9 percent, followed by a nearly
impressive 9.3 percent growth rate the following year.20
D. The Next Day Hangover
Domestic consumers began to spend beyond a prudent level
such that credit card usage went above and beyond repayment
capacity as overall economic conditions began to improve in
South Korea.2 ' Thus, by late 2002, South Korea's economy was
weighed down with approximately $100 billion in credit card debt,
not including personal loan debt obligations. The debt levels
19 See Larkin, supra note 10.
20 See Jahyeong Koo & Sherry L. Kiser, Recovery from a Financial Crisis: The
Case of South Korea, ECON. & FIN. REV. 25 (2001).
21 Larkin, supra note 10. As background, in less than six years South Korean
households went from being largely debt-free in 1997-98 to holding an average of
$27,000 in debt per household. Almost four million Koreans have defaulted on credit-
card debt and household loans, a figure representing close to ten percent of the country's
population. The effect has been more than $375 billion in household debt. As one
example of the dire effects relating to the credit card crisis, LG Card (South Korea's
second largest credit card company at the time) collapsed in 2003, creating great concern
in Korea about rising consumer debt and the fear of massive defaults. LG Card had
started to rationalize its operations by disposing of some of its investments, including a
two percent stake in LG Investments, estimated to be worth about $149 million.
Struggling LG Card received a vote of confidence after U.S. broker Merrill Lynch
announced on August 5, 2004 that it would buy $400 million of asset-backed bonds
issued by LG Card. Id.
Shortly after the 1997-98 Crisis, the South Korean government encouraged the
growth of credit cards to boost consumer spending, but paid a heavy price in defaults.
Credit card companies and banks extended credit with little concern for repayment risk
because of knowledge that the government wanted to increase debt spending with the
strong implication that credit was tacitly underwritten by the national treasury. In 2003,
new legislation, known as the Regulation on Supervision of Credit-Specialized Financial
Business (in which Chapter V relates to consumer protection and preservation of credit
order), was passed mandating that credit card firms curb their credit allocations, insist on
credit checks, and temper cash loans. Id.
22 Id. at 2.
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equaled nearly seventy-five percent of South Korea's 2003 annual
economic output, or in other terms, nearly $365 billion in
household debt.23
E. Confucian Consumer Constraint
Such a credit card problem was in large part unforeseeable in a
conservative nation that places a high priority on traditional
Confucian ideals. In part due to such ideals, the government
seemingly presumed that the potential of public dishonor of
bankruptcy would mitigate both the likelihood of spending more
than earnings and the potential of personal bankruptcies.24
The sudden availability of credit lines that could be spent at
any time proved too overwhelming for South Koreans, especially
given that most individual credit card debtors are under forty years
of age on average. 25 Additionally, because of the 1999 initiative,
lack of detailed personal credit history information, and rigid
privacy laws, credit cards could be obtained by many Koreans
without proper credit checks. The resulting credit card spending
binge rapidly transformed into South Korea's current and ongoing
credit card hangover, detailed in the following table summarizing
South Korean credit card delinquency levels from 1998 to 2003.
Table 1. Credit Card Delinquency Levels in South Korea (1998-
2003)26
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Credit Card
Delinquents 193 199.6 208.4 245 263.6 372
(in millions)
Increase Amount 50.1 6.6 8.8 36.6 18.6 108.4
(in millions)
23 See Schofield, supra note 11.
24 Post-1997-98 modem Korean society individual demands and materialistic needs
counter such traditional ideals that stemmed in large part from the Korean Chosun period
(1392-1910). Specifically, many Koreans, including many younger Koreans, saw credit
cards as a relatively easy way to obtain formerly unobtainable high priced luxury goods.
Id.
25 Larkin, supra note 10.
26 Ministry of Finance website (March 10, 2004), http://webdb02.korcham.net
/korchamnet/kcndata/epic/files/200403151308/D0403016.ppt.
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II. The Proposed Hangover Solution: IDRA
The sudden surge in credit card debt levels caused the Korean
government to act once again. But instead of trying to resolve the
issue of how to get Koreans to spend more, the Korean
government was placed in the awkward position of needing to
assist consumers who overspent as a direct result of the
government's earlier 1999 initiatives.
The government's proposed solution to the new consumer
excess spending problem came in the form of the Individual
Debtor Rehabilitation Act (IDRA), passed by the South Korean
National Assembly on March 2, 2004, and effective as of
September 23, 2004.27 The practical effect of IDRA is to provide
relief for qualified debtors of individual debt claims, including the
extension of debt repayment schedules for up to eight years.
IDRA provides a rehabilitation program for individual debtors
who have income, but who are otherwise at risk of bankruptcy.
Eligibility is limited to those who will receive a set amount of
salary either through employment or self-employment. Coverage
for individual debtors is limited to KRW 28 500 million for
unsecured debt29 and KRW 1 billion for guaranteed debt.3 ° IDRA
covers debt obligations owed to financial institutions as well as
private liabilities. Debtors owing between KRW 300 million and
KRW 1.5 billion may receive benefits pursuant to IDRA. The
debtor in need of IDRA protection must apply directly to the court
that has jurisdiction with respect to the debtor's residence.3
In terms of the IDRA application process, potential applicants
must file their plans for debt annulment to the court of jurisdiction
within two weeks of applying for IDRA related protection.32 The
court of jurisdiction must reach a decision on the eligibility of the
27 See generally IDRA.
28 KRW refers to the Korean won, the national currency of South Korea. A
conventional benchmark for conversion into US dollar (USD) is 1000 KRW per 1 USD.
29 Unsecured debt refers to debt obligation that is not collateralized.
30 Guaranteed debt refers to debt obligations that have a guarantor feature. In other
words, in the event that any payment obligation is not made as scheduled, then the
guarantor may be liable to "step into the shoes" of the debtor and make one or more
outstanding payments.
31 IDRA art. 3(l).
32 Id. art. 71(1).
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applicant for IDRA benefits within one month of receiving the
application.33 Once an application is accepted, the rights of the
lender and all rights related to the collection of debts, such as
provisional seizure and rights to a guarantee of debts, are put on
hold and the property of the debtor cannot be sold without court
permission.34
A maximum of eight years is allocated for pardoning of
debts. If the debtor can repay such owed debt in accordance with
the submitted IDRA plan, the remaining debt may be pardoned by
court decision. However, if the debtor cannot repay such debt in
accordance with the plan laid out by the court, the court will deem
the entire plan null and void.36
Moreover, even if the debtor complies with the agreed upon
schedule and owed debts are fully repaid within eight years, the
debtor is still liable for certain charges. These charges may
include relevant surplus charges, penalty fees, damages due to
unlawful conduct, and duties to employees, including unpaid
salary and retirement pay, if the debtor is deemed a business
owner.
37
The amount of debt required for further debt annulment after
eight years is still a matter left to specific legislation. In the event
of fraud in reporting the total amount of the debtor's property or
any actions that cause damage to the lender, the entire IDRA
restructuring process may become void.38 Further, the debtor
cannot re-apply for IDRA protection for the next five years.39
IDRA effectively rescues certain individual debtors, provided
that they possess the potential to continuously and repeatedly earn
future income," while at the same time protecting certain creditor
33 Id. art. 56(1).
34 Id. art. 60.
35 Id. art. 71(5).
36 Id. art. 79(1).
37 IDRA art. 87.
38 Id.
39 If it is determined that fraud exists in reporting property, which directly damaged
the relevant lender, then the debtor is subject to either five years imprisonment with hard
labor or a fee of KRW 50 million. Id. art. 92.
40 Id. art. 2 (explaining the sources of the "incomes" of the candidates).
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interests.41 Prior to the enactment of IDRA, individual bankruptcy
issues were governed by Korean bankruptcy law.42 Under these
bankruptcy laws, creditors were unable to receive any of their
owed obligations if a court ruling related to the individual
bankruptcy case, such as when the debtor was sentenced to
imprisonment or ordered to refrain from further financial
dealings. 43  Generally, IDRA-related cases are subject to the
debtor's local court jurisdiction, as determined by the debtor's
official address. If no such local court is available, the location of
the debtor's property, rather than the debtor's official address,
determines which local court has jurisdiction.44 Under this section,
interest-related parties (i.e., creditors) may lodge an immediate
complaint within fourteen days of the court's sentence 45 and any
dissatisfaction with the decision can be appealed thereafter, but
only in writing.46
In terms of procedural issues, the IDRA process begins when
the debtor applies for IDRA consideration by submitting certain
required IDRA-related documents to the relevant local court.
Once the debtor submits the application, the court considers
whether the candidate has the relevant qualification under IDRA.47
41 Id. art. 1.
42 Under current Korean bankruptcy law relating to individual bankruptcy (Gyein
Pabsahn Sohbejahpahsahn), when an individual consumer fails to repay debts the court
liquidates all of the debtor's properties towards creditor repayment as a compulsory
measure. One distinguishable section between IDRA and current Korean bankruptcy
law falls within the sections relating to the granting of immunity. For example, under
the current Korean bankruptcy law, all debtor-owned property is disposed of by the court
before the debtor receives immunity via a court decree. Yet, under IDRA, the debtor
need not dispose of all properties to receive such immunity from the court. Moreover,
evidence in the form of official records reflecting the debtor's default will exist until
such immunity is granted, while the debtor under the IDRA rehabilitation process does
not have such disadvantages. See (v1--_±) (Pahsahn Bup) (Korean Bankruptcy law) art
7, 15 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law].
43 Id. art. 47.
44 IDRA art. 2(1).
45 Id. art. 11.
46 Where there is a "supervision committee," established pursuant to the Corporate
Rearrangement Act (Hyoesa Chungri Buhp) Article 93(2), this committee can evaluate
the process of the Act during the trial process. See IDRA art. 13(1).
46 Id. art. 13(1).
47 Id. art. 1. "IDRA is designed to effectively rescue those who are suffering from
financial bankruptcy, who possess potential to continuously and repeatedly earn incomes
[Vol. 3 1
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Within fourteen days after the debtor's IDRA application is
submitted, the debtor submits the required "repayment plan" to the
court. 48 Thereafter, the court determines whether to accept or
reject the IDRA application. In the event that the application is
accepted, any parties with a related interest to the specific
proceeding, such as debtors or creditors, may file an application
within fourteen days following the court's ruling. 9
The definition of property under IDRA, includes "all
properties owned by the debtor [until] the individual rescue
process begins"5 and "all properties earned by the debtor during
the individual rescue process."'" The relevance of defining
property is that the local court will factor in the debtor's asset
amounts to determine whether the debtor-applicant has the ability
to repay debt obligations. The assumption is that the more assets
and property owned, the greater the likelihood that the local court
may grant IDRA protection. The rationale is that more property
translates into more assets capable of liquidation to repay owed
debt obligations.52
Assets not included under "Individual Rescue Property" are
in the future." Id.
48 Id. art. 70.
49 IDRA art. 11. If the application is accepted, pursuant to Article 13, the court can
organize a "supervision committee," which effectively oversees the entire IDRA-related
process with the local court. Thereafter, pursuant to Article 62, the rescue committee
(which focuses on IDRA's contents, such as supervising the debtor's repayment plan
schedule) investigates the debtor's properties and incomes. Pursuant to Article 24,
Clause 1, the designated local court then determines the debtor's asset amounts, such as
the properties owned by the debtor (referred to as "Individual Rescue Property"), and
determines the amount of credits the debtor holds (referred to as "Individual Rescue
Credits" or "Individual Rescue Institutional Credits"). The court then examines the
debtor's "repayment plan." Thereafter, the court announces its decision (normally
within one month from the debtor's application date), whereby the debtor repayment
payment schedules are typically restructured such that the debt repayment period is
extended, but not lasting longer than eight years after the court's approval of the debtor's
repayment plan. Id.
50 Id. art. 24(1).
51 Id. art. 24(2).
52 The debtor, under IDRA Article 24, also has the right "to manage or dispose of
his/her property." However, the properties that are included as part of the debtor-
submitted "repayment plan" must be managed or disposed of per such debtor's
repayment plan. Id. art. 24.
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properties53 that cannot be seized, housing expenses of the debtor
and individuals supported by the debtor (i.e., dependent family of
the debtor), and six months worth of living expenses as required
by the debtor and those persons financially supported by the
debtor.5
4
Being subject to the IDRA process means that the debtor
(applicant for the IDRA process) should repay a specified amount
of owed debt obligations. However, the IDRA legislation is silent
as to what exactly should be the minimum level of debtor
repayment.55 Presumably, the minimum level is left to the local
court's discretion.56 Therefore, it is necessary for the local court to
clarify what properties and income should or should not be used
for repayment. IDRA provisions provide that most of the incomes
and properties, excluding minimum living expenses but including
housing expenses, are liable for such repayment.57
53 IDRA is silent as to exactly what such properties may be. See generally id.
54 Id. art. 25(1) (exempting certain property).
55 The amount of the repaid debt is designated in the debtor's "repayment plan."
The court examines the debtor's repayment plan, including but not limited to, the
debtor's income, properties, and owed debt obligations, in determining the amount of
repayment the debtor should make pursuant to IDRA. See IDRA art. 24.
56 Id.
57 See generally IDRA. Because IDRA is designed primarily to provide a method
by which debtors can repay their credit obligations, it is important to explicitly define
what kind of debts fall under the ambit of the IDRA process, what kind of debts should
be repaid, and in what order such debts should be repaid. In this regard, provisions three
and four of IDRA provide language as to what constitutes debt obligations. Id.
In short, two types of debt (referred to as "credits" under IDRA's language)
exist: individual and institutional debt. In terms of creditor payout hierarchy,
institutional credits receive priority over individual (non-institutional) credits. In other
words, the debtor must repay institutional debts owed prior to repaying individual debts
owed, whereby such debtor payout hierarchy must also be reflected in the debtors
"repayment plan," pursuant to IDRA Article 39. Id.
Relating to individual debts (referred to as "Individual Rescue Credits"), such
debts can be covered only if such debt was incurred due to events or reasons prior to the
IDRA process, as per Articles 26-29. Moreover, among "Individual Rescue Credits"
debts, such as interest (which accrue after the IDRA process began) and IDRA related
expenditures follow after "Individual Rescue Credits." Id.
Second, institutional individual debt obligations (referred to as "Individual
Rescue Institutional Credits") are defined under Article 36, Clause 3, as (1) payment and
expenditures relating to the "rescue committee" (under Article 61 and Article 40, Clause
1); (2) taxes (under article 40, clause 2); (3) fees, retirement grants, and accident
compensations for the employees of the debtors (under article 40, clause 3). Id.
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IDRA also grants a "veto power" to prevent debtors from
committing certain actions intentionally to damage creditors, such
as nominal transfer of properties (i.e., houses) to families before
going into the IDRA process. 58  The local court can order the
debtor to conduct the veto power on the request of the creditors or
rescue committee, or by the court's own right. However, this veto
power cannot be used after one year of the decision to begin the
IDRA process and/or five years following the completion of any
such actions.59 Although the veto power is referred to as a legal
"right" of the debtor, the actual drafters' intent is to preserve the
creditors' interest. Moreover, under IDRA Article 5, the right of
set-off apparently also exists. 60
In terms of initiating the actual IDRA process, provision six
discusses the specific requirements. Individuals qualified to apply
for IDRA are (1) individual debtors who have the ability to earn
income "continuously and repeatedly" per IDRA Article 1 (based
mostly on the rescue committee and/or local court's discretion)
through employment or owning a business; and (2) individual
debtors who have debt either (a) under KRW 1,000,000,000 of
individual credits, which include liens, the right of pledge,
mortgages, negotiable instruments, and provisional registration
securities; or (b) individual credits under KRW 500,000,000,
except for the aforementioned credits.61
The IDRA applicant should submit the written IDRA
application detailing relevant information, such as the debtor's
name and Korean identification number, the reason and purpose
for applying, and the property and credits of the debtor. Also, the
applicant should attach the following: (1) a list of the creditors
with their name, address, and the amount and reason of the credit;
(2) a list of properties owned; (3) a list of the debtor's incomes and
spending; (4) related documents, in the event that the applicant has
58 Id. art. 43.
59 Id.
60 Id. art. 5. The legal right to "set off' gives the debtor and/or the creditor the
option to apply owed payments (future cashflows in) towards any obligations owed
(future cashflows out). For example, if debtor was owed KRW 10,000,000 and creditor
owed debtor KRW 8,000,000, then the debtor could "set off' such debt owed from
creditor, which effectively reduces debtor's owed amount to KRW 2,000,000 (KRW
10,000,000-8,000,000) rather than KRW 10,000,000.
61 IDRA art. 48.
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previously applied for individual bankruptcy (under the existing
Korean Bankruptcy Act) or IDRA; (5) data that attests to the fact
that the debtor is an employer or a business owner; and (6) other
documents which the Supreme Court deems necessary and
relevant to the process.62 Also, the applicant should pay in
advance the process expenses determined by the Supreme Court's
rule.63
The local court, separate from the Supreme Court, has
jurisdiction to decide whether to execute the IDRA process for the
debtor. The time period for the court's decision is normally within
one month after the case is filed. Any objection by relevant
creditors should be filed within two months after the court's
decision to grant IDRA repayment protection. 64
The local court may also reject the applicant when: (1) the
debtor fails to meet the specified qualifications pursuant to
IDRA; 65 (2) the debtor fails to file the documents required by
IDRA Article 49, or fraudulently writes and/or submits
documents, or does not meet the application deadline set forth by
the court (i.e., on or before fourteen days of the applicant's
original application); (3) the debtor fails to pay the required IDRA
process-related expenses; (4) the debtor fails to meet the
repayment plan deadline; (5) the debtor-applicant has been
previously rejected for the IDRA process within five years prior to
the most recently submitted IDRA application; (6) the debtor
received court-ordered immunity (including the immunity by the
bankruptcy process) within the past ten years; (7) the debtor's
submitted repayment plan fails to amount to the general creditors'
interest; or (8) for any other reasons such as, but not limited to, the
court's determination that the application has not been filed in
good faith, or is seen as merely trying to delay debt repayment
without reasonable justification.66
Under IDRA, the local court has discretion to appoint the
62 Id. art. 49.
63 Id. art. 50
64 Id. art. 56(l)-(2).
65 IDRA's current language is silent as to exactly what standards would preclude an
applicant from receiving IDRA protection, apart from meeting the aforementioned
standards per IDRA Article 48. See generally id.
66 Id. art. 55
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67members of a rescue committee. Pursuant to provision seven,
the rescue committee investigates and observes the execution
process of IDRA, subsequent to approval by the court.68 In effect,
the Rescue Committee is a supervisory organization that oversees
the execution of the overall IDRA rehabilitation process.69
Pursuant to IDRA provision eight, creditors can participate in
the court's determination of the amounts that should be repaid to
them under the IDRA process. This provision specifies that
creditors who object to the contents of the creditors list, which
details what amounts are owed to which creditors, may request a
"Trial for Settling Individual Rescue Credit" during the objection
period.7" For example, creditors have from two weeks to two
months after the court's decision by which to accept the
applicant's repayment plan to initiate the IDRA process. In this
case, the plaintiff is the creditor and the defendant is the debtor;
the party that participates in the IDRA process and submitted the
creditors list.71 The local court has the discretion to rule whether
such a trial may proceed.72
Provision nine under IDRA discusses specifics related to the
debtor repayment plan. Under this process, the debtor should
submit his or her repayment plan within fourteen days following
the submitted application for the IDRA process.73 The repayment
plan should contain details of properties and incomes that can be
used for repayment, repayment details of the debtor's individual
rescue institutional credits and other credits, and repayment details
67 The members of the committee may consist of (1) a member of the supervision
committee; (2) the administrative official of the court; or (3) any other individuals per
the discretion of the Supreme Court. The Rescue Committee investigates the debtor's
properties and income as well as oversees the debtor meeting's process. Id. art. 61.
68 Id. art. 62.
69 Id. art. 62(1).
70 Id. art. 64(1).
71 Id. art. 64.
72 "Individual Rescue Credits" will be determined based on whether creditors
(listed on the creditor list) requested a "Trial for Settling Individual Rescue Credit"
during the relevant period, or if the creditor's request for a "Trial for Settling Individual
Rescue Credit" was rejected by the court. After the amount of the individual rescue
credit is determined, the IDRA process may begin. IDRA is silent as to the exact
timeframe and criteria for such processes. See generally IDRA.
73 Id. art. 70(1).
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of all or part of the debtor's individual rescue credits.74
The court will approve the repayment plan when: (1) the
repayment plan is suitable75 to the provisions of the law; (2) the
repayment plan is fair and viable; (3) payment of certain IDRA-
related administrative fees and expenses prior to the approval of
the debtor's repayment plan; and (4) the whole amount of the
individual rescue credit estimated until the day of the approval of
the court, is not less than the amount of debt that the debtor has to
pay when seeking bankruptcy protection.76 In terms of debt
repayment creditor priority, the IDRA Rescue Committee is first
in line for any payments made by the debtor, followed by
payments to relevant creditors.77
While positive language in provision nine stipulates what
criteria may be considered in terms of granting IDRA debtor
protection, provision ten details in negative prose what criteria
local courts may consider in terms of rejecting an IDRA
applicant's repayment plan.78 Specifically, the local court may
terminate the IDRA process both before and after repayment plan
approval. When terminating the IDRA process before the grant of
judicial approval, the court may exercise discretion when the court
cannot approve the repayment plan from the debtor because it
appears to be written in purposefully ambigous language, the
debtor provides a false basis for court testimony, or fails to attend
an IDRA-related judicial hearing.7 9  Even after the court's
74 IDRA art. 72(1).
75 As currently written, IDRA is silent as to how the term "suitable" can be
interpreted. See id.
76 Generally, under current South Korean bankruptcy law, a repayment schedule
option exists. See Bankruptcy Law, supra note 42, arts. 40-42. In such a case, the
amount of the individual rescue credit can be less than the owed debt amount following
the bankruptcy filing, provided that all relevant creditors agree. Id. art. 74.
77 In this process, the debtor makes payments to the the IDRA-appointed rescue
committee, which oversees the entire payout process. Thereafter, the rescue committee
makes repayments to the debtor's creditors per the IDRA court-approved repayment
plan. However, this rule does not apply when (1) no rescue committee exists; or (2) the
repayment plan or the approval of the repayment plan is structured such that the rule
does not apply. Id. art. 76.
78 Id. arts. 70-78 (relating to the factors in the consideration of the IDRA
Repayment Plan). See also id. arts. 79-86 (relating to the factors in the decision to reject
the IDRA Repayment Plan).
79 Id. art. 79.
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approval of the debtor's repayment plan, either by the official
authority of the court or by the request of relevant creditors, the
plan can still be abolished or amended. This may occur when it is
evident that the debtor is not able to repay the debts that are
provided for pursuant to the repayment plan, or the debtor fails to
repay owed debts per the court-approved IDRA repayment plan as
a direct result of the debtor's illegal conduct, such as concealing
property or income. 0
Moreover, the court should give immunity to the debtor by the
official authority of the court or by debtor request when the debtor
completes the repayment plan. However, the court can give
immunity to the debtor even though the debtor failed to complete
the repayment due to reasons which the debtor could not control,
or the entire amount of the individual rescue credit estimated (up
to the court approval date) is not less than the amount of debt that
the debtor has to pay when declaring bankruptcy, and the
amendment of the repayment plan is deemed "impossible.' The
court cannot grant immunity to debtor applicants when they omit
material individual rescue credits from the credit list in bad faith,
or if they fail to observe their responsibilities and duties under
IDRA. s2
III. Analysis
A. IDRA: Winners and Losers
Given the scope and mandate of IDRA and related debt relief
programs covered in this paper, this section analyzes the potential
winners and losers under the Act. In short, the potential winners
80 IDRA art. 80.
81 IDRA is silent as to exactly what repayment plan would be deemed
"impossible." See generally id.
82 In terms of penalties pursuant to IDRA Articles 87, 88, and 90, the local court
has the ability to impose penalties when: (1) the debtor attempted to conceal the debtor's
property or decrease the burden of repayment for the purpose of harming related
creditors (i.e., acts of fraud or willful misrepresentation); (2) the rescue committee or the
supervisory committee engages in acts of bribery; or (3) the debtor's property
investigation takes place for purposes other than those expressly mandated pursuant to
IDRA (i.e., the debtor's property is investigated in bad faith outside the purview of
IDRA). IDRA-related penalties can include both civil (KRW 50,000,000) and criminal
(up to five years imprisonment) action. See id. arts. 83, 87-90.
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are qualified individual debtors who are effectively being "bailed
out" of debt pursuant to the Act;8 3 foreign financial institutions
that may be eager to purchase Korean won-denominated NPLs for
future upside (addressed in the NPL table below); Korean
institutions which will be able to receive injected public funds into
their balance sheets vis-A-vis the Act; and from a political
purview, the ruling South Korean Uri political party that helped to
push the Act into passage on September 23, 2004. The potential
losers are the Korean taxpayers who are effectively paying to bail
83 In practice, the number of debtors seeking credit card bailouts has increased
since IDRA's introduction in September 2004, with the total number of applicants for
IDRA and/or IDRA-type debt rescue programs at approximately 38,828 and the
government reviewing an average of 4,000 applications every month for such programs.
See Ji-young Kwan & Chung-un Cho, Over 20,000 Debtors Rescured in First Year of
Court Bailout, KOREA HERALD ONLINE, Sept. 23, 2005, http://www.koreaherald
.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2005/09/23/200509230033.asp. Most IDRA applicants are
between ages 40 and 49 (31.7 percent), with men comprising 60.2% of debtors,
compared to 39.8 percent for women. Id. The cumulative average debt range is from 50
million to 100 million won, with "business failure" being given as the main reason for
such individual bankruptcy cases. Id. And most directly relating to this paper, credit
card bills represented the largest proportion of individual debt within such programs,
representing about 59.8% of total individual average debt under such programs. Id.
At first blush, these numbers may appear to give IDRA some credibility in terms
of resolving South Korea's credit card bankruptcy binge spending hangover. However,
IDRA and its related programs failed to meet expectations for several reasons. First,
before IDRA, the Supreme Court expected more than 10,000 defaulters per month to
register, but the court received less than half of that number of applications in 2004, the
first year of IDRA's implementation. Second, the numbers clearly demonstrate that
debtors in default prefer to pursue private debt counseling programs, such as the Credit
Counseling & Recovery Service (CCRS), which has received up to 20,000 applications,
rather than the public court system linked to the IDRA program. Id. In terms of costs,
CCRS is much less (requiring a fee of 50,000 won, or about $48) than IDRA's complex
court-guided paperwork structure, which typically requires legal assistance amounting to
an extra 1 to 2 million KRW ($1000 to $2000). Third, the IDRA process is both
cumbersome and slow, often taking several months for the court to accept or reject an
individual debtor's rescue plan. Id.
Moreover, if an individual consumer had overdue debts of 300,000 Korean won
for three months, such person would be classified as a "credit delinquent" and thereafter
be placed on a creditor "black list" of the financial institutions for one year. As IDRA
effectively "rescues" (or bails out) a debtor from debt, the IDRA applicant may avoid the
notorious title of "credit delinquent" and lower both the time spent and the likelihood of
being placed on the "black list" used by Korean financial institutions. See Kim Dong-ho &
Park Sung-ha, Credit Black List Goes: New Systems Come In, JooNGANG DAILY, Apr. 25,
2005, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200504/24/2005042422410802799000
90509052.html.
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out individual credit card debtors and perhaps the reputation of the
Korean financial infrastructure due to a "moral hazard" concern.84
Table 2. NPL Levels for Korea from 1998 to 200185
1998 1999 2000 2001
Trillions of Korean Won 118.0 88.0 64.6 39.1
B. Why Bail Out Credit Card Debtors?
This section discusses a balancing of such considerations as
well as an analysis relating to the relevant arguments for and
against bailing out individual credit card debtors pursuant to
IDRA.
The Korean National Assembly originally passed IDRA with
the view that the benefits of action outweighed the costs of
inaction as it related to the Korean credit card crisis. In other
words, Korean legislators feared that action could potentially be
more detrimental than inaction from both an economic and social86
perspective.87
84 The issue of "moral hazard" can be evidenced in theory and practice in the South
Korean case. For example, since late 2004, following IDRA's passage and various
government official statements relating to individual debt assistance programs, debtor
payments have dropped. For example, the Credit Recovery Committee reported that as
of mid-December 2004, the number of debt adjustment applicants exceeded 1,000 per
day. However, following Finance Minister Lee Hun-jai's January 7, 2005 statement that
the ministry may exempt certain principal debts owed, the debt restructuring plan
applicant levels dropped to 400 the next day. Further, an average of 4,000 consulting
cases existed in November 2004 (following IDRA's September 2004 passage), a number
that fell to 476 on January 8 (the day following Minister Lee's comments above). Taken
from a big picture purview, this signals that debtors are waiting longer to repay debt
obligations in the view that, "they will receive some sort of benefit" for possibly making
payments at some point in the future rather than now. See Wohn Dong-Hee, Debtors
Abandon Payments, JOONGANG DAILY, Jan. 18, 2005, at 3, available at
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200501/17/200501172242012509900090509051 .html.
85 Dong He, The Role of KAMCO in Resolving Nonperforming Loans in the
Republic of Korea, IMF Working Paper no. WP/04/172, September 2004, at Table 1
(Non-performing Loans of Financial Institutions 1), at 9.
86 Separate from the economic, the negative social ramifications includes increased
reported cases of suicide, insurance fraud, and prostitution. See Larkin, supra note 10.
87 What may have been a primary driver behind such debt relief actions was the
fear that inaction could result in a financial crisis similar to that in 1997-98. To work
backwards, the sheer size and scope of individual credit card debt that existed in Korea,
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The aggregate effect of the large number of individual credit
card defaulters could place an extreme amount of stress 88 upon the
Korean financial infrastructure.8 9 Thus, if such lending institutions
began to fail, as in the case of Korea's former largest credit card
company LG Card,90 it could lead to a crisis in financial sector
confidence. Because lending institutions are critical to the
viability of the Korean economy, which is largely driven by large
conglomerate growth known as chaebol,9 the fall of one lending
especially after 2002, provide a basis for an argument regarding possible financial crisis.
Such credit card debt is effectively a loan with high interest rates, usually ranging from
20 to 25%, that should be repaid to the lending institution, which is usually a domestic
credit card company or financial institution. Thus, if such debt is not repaid, a net loss
equal to the expected original loan amount plus interest will result.
If only principal is repaid, then, the transaction should be net neutral, whereby
neither an upside nor a downside is realized. However, if neither principal (in part or
full) nor interest are fully repaid, then a net loss exists within the balance sheet of the
lending institution. For example, if lending institution A lends $100 equivalent to lendee
B with a twenty percent interest rate charge, then lendor expects $100 (principal only) to
be $120 (principal plus interest) on its asset side of the balance sheet. Anything less will
result in lost expected revenue, which hurts the financial viability of lending institution
A.
88 See Seriousness of Household Debts Top Bureaucrats Appear Too Optimistic,
KOREA TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at 3 ("The high risk of family credit default means that the
nation's economy is still ailing amid ever-decreasing corporate investment, rising
unemployment, intensifying labor disputes, and rampant real estate speculation.").
89 The IMF argued that South Korea's economic rebound has been hampered by a
host of problems, including huge debts incurred by credit card firms. The IMF also
pointed out a downside risk for the Korean economy that the consumption could be
weighed down by heavy household debt. Moreover, the IMF warned of the risk of moral
hazard relating to credit delinquencies due to the credit card crisis. See Cho Hyoung-
kwon, IMF Warns of Moral Hazard of Credit Delinquents, KOREA TIMES, May 30, 2004,
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times-view.php?term=imf++&path=hankooki3/times/A
pagefbiz/200405/kt2004053015303611870.htm&media=kt.
90 In April 2004, Samsung Electronics spent nearly 600 billion KRW to bail out its
affiliate and Korea's largest credit card issuer, Samsung Card Co. Thereafter, Samsung
Card Co. stated in January 2005 that it would raise 1.2 trillion KRW ($1.2 billion) selling
shares to its group affiliate, Samsung Electronics. Altogether, Samsung Electronics'
actions represented two notable bailouts in one year. The funding structure is devised
such that Samsung Card will sell 240 million new shares at 5,000 KRW per share in
March 2005. Individuals and Samsung Card employees own a combined 11.7 percent
stake in Samsung Card. See $1.2 Billion Bailout for Card Firm, JOONGANG DAILY, Jan.
29, 2005, at 3, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200501/28/2005012822300620799000905
09052.html.
91 Major credit card companies in Korea include Samsung Card Co., LG Card Co.,
Shinhan Card Co., and BC Card Co. Among these four, the first two credit card
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institution could lead to the fall of other lending institutions. This
scenario would then ultimately lead to a 1929 U.S. Great
Depression-style run on banks and a drying up of all credit
onshore in Korea. This would stifle the Korean economy and
potentially plunge the eleventh largest global economy back into
another financial crisis. 92 Thus, enacting IDRA legislation was a
reactionary attempt to send a clear message to the markets that the
government recognized this potential risk and that the language
embedded in IDRA would mitigate the potential of similar events
occurring and in turn restore confidence to the onshore markets.
Government intervention opponents have several counter-
arguments. The first argument is that bailing out individual credit
card holders creates "moral hazard," which effectively creates an
incentive for individuals to spend negligently or recklessly again
in the future with little or no fear of the consequences related to
debtor default because they will expect to be bailed out again by
the government at the taxpayers' expense. 93 The second argument
is that IDRA may represent an inefficient use of taxpayer money.
The rationale is that taxpayer revenues should be used for things
such as pension funds, healthcare, and crime prevention, rather
than subsidizing the spending habits of Korean consumers. The
third argument is that IDRA may send a dangerous signal to the
markets that the Korean government is in the business of acting as
a constant market surveyor, ready to act at any given moment if it
perceives that designated price levels have somehow crossed a
companies are the two largest conglomerates in the Korean economy. See LG Card's
Liquidity Crisis Group Chairman Koo Should Take Any Means Necessary, KOREA
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at 1.
92 See Borensztein & Lee, supra note 18, at 5-9 (discussing the monetary causes of
the South Korean "credit crunch"); see generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Murray
Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393
(1981) (discussing a slightly more theoretical purview on credit rationing effects).
93 As a matter of practice rather than theory, government action to relieve the debts
of individuals caused credit delinquents to expend less effort to pay what they owe.
After the government announced on January 7, 2005, that the Ministry of Finance and
Economy would look into exempting the principal debts, debts adjustment consulting
requests to the Credit Recovery Committee fell from average 4,000 a day in November
2004 to 476 on January 8, 2005. See Debtors Abandon Payments, JOONGANG DAILY,
Jan. 18, 2005, at 3, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200501/17/20050117224201250
9900090509051 .html.
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given line.94 Investors enter into every transaction on the basis of
caveat emptor.95 However, if the government signals that it is in
the business of acting as a market commentator-holding up red,
yellow, and green lights to signals indicate if, when, and how its
populace should spend their money-then the country's public
policy is to create a nation dependent on the government, rather
than on individuals themselves. Related risks also exist, which
include inaccuracies of information, lags in receiving information,
and lack of needed information in relation to setting forth such
legislation.96 In short, the public policy message is that individual
debtors need not evaluate relevant risks relating to their personal
expenditures, because the government will do the analysis for
them and bail them out when deemed necessary.
An additional pro-IDRA argument stems from the traditional
Keynesian economic perspective 9  and recommends that
government should play a very active hands-on management role
in relation to the public. Proponents argue this would help
mitigate actual or threatened market failures as well as instill
public confidence that a watchful force exists to protect consumers
against financial turbulence and/or crisis.
98
94 The main problem in this scenario is that such an instant price deflation towards
a certain designated level would be chosen not by the markets, as in most developed
nations, but by government bureaucrats.
95 "Let the buyer beware."
96 One of the well-known examples on incomplete information is "the parable of
separate islands." This concept was first introduced by Edmund S. Phelps in The
Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation (1970). Robert Lucas used
this parable to explain the concept of incomplete information. In his explanation Lucas
made up the economy with a single business unit based on a separate island, such that no
one knows what happens on other separate islands. With this lack of information, the
investor based on the separate island can make incorrect investment decisions.
Therefore, incomplete information may increase the risk much more than expected. See
MARTIN NEIL BAILY & PHILIP FRIEDMAN, MACROECONOMICS, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND
THE INTERNATIONAL SECTOR 468 (2d ed. 1995).
97 MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 671 (5th ed. 1997). The
fundamental lesson of Keynesian economics is that the automatic adjustment mechanism
of competition cannot be relied upon to achieve such policy objectives as full
employment and price stability. The main message of Keynesian economists is that the
automatic adjustment process of the market is too unreliable to serve as a practical basis
for a full-employment policy. Id.
98 However, after the 1997 Korean economic crisis, some academics blamed the
government-led economic development as the main reason for the economic crisis,
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The threshold issue here is what role the government should
play to assist the general public.99 In other words, what areas
should an effective and highly efficient government address to
help its people? Assuming the government can provide some
positive value-added services'0° like education, crime prevention,
and welfare reduction, it can be a highly effective means by which
to reach certain objectives for the overall societal good.'01
One argument for a Keynesian type approach 10 2 as it relates to
the issue at hand is that most, if not all, of the credit card users
involved in the Korean credit card crisis are domestic and have a
relatively shorter history of personal credit card expenditure.'0 3
Therefore, the Korean government must step in to provide market
signals. Another conceivable argument is that the 1997-98 Asian
financial crisis and the Korean credit card crisis demonstrated that
markets left unattended could cause immense damage to the
welfare of people. Such was the case for the average Korean
when individual purchasing power parity dropped dramatically as
the Korean won depreciated to unprecedented low levels against
the U.S. dollar in late 1997-98.1°4
claiming that market-oriented economic development would be necessary to overcome
the economic crisis and to develop Korean economy further. See Uk Heo & Sunwoong
Kim, Financial Crisis in South Korea: Failure of Government-Led Development
Paradigm, 40 ASIAN SURVEY 492 (2000).
99 This is in comparison to the separate issue of whether the government should
play any role at all to help assist the general public.
100 The notable exception would be those who hold true to fundamental libertarian
beliefs that less government, or even no government, is a better government since
government tends to misallocate consumer resources, thus causing more aggregate good
than harm.
101 See generally B. Greenwald & J.E. Stilglitz, Keynesian, New Keynesian, and
New Classical Economics, 39 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 119 (1987).
102 See Rebecca Harding, One Semester Economics: An Introduction for Business
and Management Students, 190-91, Blackwell Publishers (February 1999)
103 Personal investors are also referred to as "retail investors." See Frank J. Fabozzi
and Franco Modligliani, Capital Markets: Institutions and Instruments, 263-64 (3d ed.
2002). Fabozzi notes that three distinctions exist between retail and institutional
investors. First, transaction size of retail investors is much less relative to institutional
investors. Second, individual investors tend to pay more in transaction commissions
than institutional investors. Third, retail investors use stockbrokers, while institutional
investors use institutional broker/deal desks to execute orders. Id.
104 In late December 1997-98, the Korean won to U.S. Dollar (USD) exchange rate
was nearly 2000 KRW/USD. Uk & Sunwoong, supra note 98, at 493. Given that the
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Even assuming that a relatively short credit card usage history
exists with South Korean consumers, which may or may not be
tied to an increased propensity for reckless spending, the
underlying principle should exist that such consumers are free to
choose what they purchase. Moreover, consumers should bear full
responsibility for their fiscal behavior, whether it is prudent or
reckless. Similarly, who should be held responsible if IDRA does
not have the intended effect of creating a "soft landing" for
uncontrolled credit card debt? If the answer is that the fault still
lies on the individual spender, per the principle of caveat emptor,
then little rationale exists for the Act in the first place, because the
policy would merely shift massive credit card debt from one class
(the original credit card debtors) to another class (the taxpayers).
A similar pro-interventionist argument is that the 1997-98
Asian financial crisis is evidence that the public, including the
original credit card debtors, needs to be protected from the
markets through government protective legislation. Perhaps then
useful government action could occur by focusing on the effects of
another possible financial crisis rather than the perceived credit
card crisis itself.'°5 This would instill investor confidence without
market interference. Furthermore, less risk exists that the
proposed legislation may over or undershoot its objectives,
triggering a potential financial negative blip or a potential mass
sell-off in the Korean financial markets in a more extreme case.
Thus, the focus should instead be on improving credit history
checks on individuals applying for credit cards and improving risk
management of credit lending institutions.
A separate and distinguishable argument against market
intervention is that the Act may not have its intended effect in the
current benchmark stands at about 1200KRW/USD, this means an approximate two-
thirds drop in purchasing power parity within a six-month period. Federal Bank of New
York website, at http://www.ny.frb.org/marketslfxrates/historical/fx.cfn. See generally
RONALD W. MELICHER & EDGAR A. NORTON FINANCE INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONS,
INVESTMENTS, AND MANAGEMENT 164-65 (2000) (discussing foreign exchange issues
generally).
105 However, market intervention by the Korean government is considered a factor
that has negative effects on the Korean economy. The IMF stated that "the Korean
economy is better guided by market principles thanks to reduced government
intervention in recent years." See Sim Sung-tae, IMF Sees Rebound in Korean Economy
by Early Next Year, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 29, 2004, available at http://www.
koreaherald.co.kr/archives.
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markets. 10 6  The basic rationale is that market intervention is a
risky business. In addition to the risks already mentioned, such as
lags, undershooting, and overshooting of stated objectives, highly
respected economists, such as Ronald Coase °7 and Alan
Greenspan,' °8 have advocated strong deference to the markets and
postulated alternatives to government enforced taxation.I°9
C. Relevant Risks
In short, several broad risks exist with implementing the Act,
in addition to several tangential sub-risks. The first broad risk is
that the Act could send a dangerous signal to the markets that the
Korean government is in the business of acting as constant market
surveyor ready to strike when it perceives that designated debt
levels have crossed the fine line from not enough consumer debt
spending to too much consumer debt spending.10
Investors enter into every transaction on the basis of caveat
106 See generally IDRA (stating the objectives of IDRA).
107 Ronald Coase won the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics "for his discovery and
clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the
institutional structure and functioning of the economy." Coase served as faculty for the
University of Chicago, was editor of the University of Chicago's Journal of Law and
Economics, and received a B.Sc. (Econ) from the London School of Economics.
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1991/.
108 Regarding Greenspan's view on regulation and regulators, the U.S. Federal
Chairman is quoted as saying:
Super-regulators tend to overregulate and make unbelievable mistakes. I would
suspect that I would know most of the people who would be in charge of
making the types of judgments that would be required for that, and I will tell
you that they don't have a clue as to what to do. I would much prefer to allow
very complex market forces to tell us.
BOB WOODWARD, MAESTRO: GREENSPAN'S FED AND THE AMERICAN BOOM 194 (2001).
109 The alternative approach by Ronald Coase is known as the "property rights"
approach, which is an alternative approach to the more standard "tax or subsidy"
approach posited by British economist, A.C. Pigou. The "property rights" approach
suggests that creating new private sector institutions is better than using taxes or
subsidies. See THOMAS A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 189 (12th ed.).
Moreover, during a speech for a central bank symposium in Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, Greenspan was also quoted as saying, "I find it difficult to conceive of an
adequate degree of central bank certainty to justify the scale of pre-emptive tightening
that would likely be necessary to neutralise a bubble." Greenspan Defends Fed Actions,
BBC NEWS, Aug. 30, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2226174.stm.
110 See supra note 94.
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emptor. If the government sends out signals that it is in the
business of acting as market commentator, this will lead to the
nation's becoming dependent on the government and in the
process undermine the importance of investor self-reliance.
Related risks exist as well, including inaccuracies of information,
lags in receiving information, and lack of needed information."'
In short, the practical effect would be that the Act would signal to
individual investors that they need not evaluate relevant spending
risks, because the government will bail them out if the situation is
dire enough to warrant intervention. In other words, the more
reckless the spending behavior, the higher the likelihood of being
bailed out. Such behavior strikes at the core of how the Act could
promote moral hazard to the detriment of both the South Korean
and international financial markets.'
12
In comparison, the U.S. government has, with rare
exception," 3 purposely chosen not to send out clear market
signals that would have the net effect of explicit guidance relating
to personal investment decisions.'' 4 Instead, Federal Reserve
chairman Alan Greenspan opted to focus Federal Reserve policy
towards the spending bubble's "consequences" rather than on the
spending bubble itself."5  From a broad policy standpoint, the
Federal Reserve's policy instilled confidence that the markets, not
the U.S. government, would dictate prices in the short and long
111 See supra note 96.
112 Government-led Korean economic development during the 1970s also caused
moral hazard problems. By the early 1970s, government-supported industrial groups
(mostly large conglomerates) were highly leveraged with loan guarantees through the
banks owned by the government. As the government became a partner responsible for
their failure as well as success, this bailout induced excessive risk taking. See Yung
Chul Park, Development Lessons from Asia: The Role of Government in South Korea
and Taiwan, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 118 (1990).
113 One example of such a rare exception occurred in the late 1980s with the savings
and loan crisis in which the U.S. government created the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) as a mechanism to assist the many troubled banking institutions involved. See
generally MARK CASSELL, How GOVERNMENTS PRIVATIZE THE POLITICS OF DIVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 3 (2002).
1l4 For example, in the late 1990s, Chairman Alan Greenspan of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board elected not to implement a tight monetary policy (i.e., to raise real
interest rates) in an effort to burst the apparent spending bubble.
115 This type of non-interventionist policy helped to fuel the largest post-war
economic expansion in U.S. history and created unprecedented wealth creation for
millions of Americans. See Greenspan Defends Fed Actions, supra note 109.
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run. "16
The second broad risk is that, even assuming a debt-spending
hangover scenario, what test should the government apply to
intervene in the markets? Ideally, such a test would be uniform,
clear, and transparent in order to bolster investor confidence. As it
stands now, however, no statement has been given to the general
public regarding the exact methodology as to when, how, and to
what extent the government will apply any further related
legislation."' Such inaction does not reflect uniformity, clarity, or
transparency. Instead, such inaction will signal to the markets that
the socio-political, economic, and legal landscape in South Korea
has changed drastically from a relatively transparent investment
environment based on open and free market principles back to the
pre-1997-98 crony capitalistic days of old." 8 This would result in
a reversion back to a system in which the government and the
markets could theoretically at times be indistinguishable, in which
the government could heavily influence macroeconomic growth,
and in which the government rather than the markets would dictate
investment behavior.' 19
The third broad risk is that IDRA may prove too successful in
that it runs the risk of overreaching its stated objectives. At first
blush, this notion may seem counter-intuitive. However, looking
at recent Korean economic history, a clear reminder of this likely
116 Alan Greenspan's policy of not attempting to burst the late 1990s equities bubble
is sometimes colloquially referred to as "Bubble Management." See, e.g., Caroline
Baum, Has Greenspan Changed Views on Bubble Mangaement?, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
June 5, 2005, http://quote.bloomberg.conapps/news?pid=10000039&refer=columnist
baum&sid=alnWu9XbFojs.
117 For a specific example, the new bill on debt reorganization and bankruptcy,
which would combine the mishmash of existing bankruptcy laws, was held up in the
National Assembly, without any guarantee it would eventually pass. See Jung-wook Kim
& So-young Moon, Bankruptcy Bill Held Up: Disputes, Complexity Hinder Passage,
JOONGANG DAILY, Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200502/16
/20050216222827153990009050905 1.html.
118 For a broad overview on the influential role of the state within the South Korean
economy, see generally, Tony F. Yu, Entrepreneurial State: The Role of Government in
the Economic Development of the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies, 15 DEV. POL'Y
REV. 47 (1997). On the contrary, for an academic survey that discusses the limitation of
the state's role within the South Korean economy, see generally, Jong-Chan Rhee, THE
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outcome arises. Shortly after the 1997-98 Crisis in Korea, 120 the
government initiated several purposeful measures directly aimed
at spuring consumer lending.12' The government aggressively
promoted credit card usage in South Korea to spur domestic
economic spending and therefore macroeconomic growth.122
Less than ten years after the 1997-98 Crisis, the Korean
economy is in trouble again. The population is heavily debt-
ridden,123 not due to any run on the official Korean won, or
because the government's national economic recovery plan to
increase consumer lending failed to be effective, but because the
plan was overly effective. Specifically, Korean consumers had
instant access to a large pool of funds in the form of credit
availability, many for the first time. Consumers with little
experience, and apparently little fiscal discipline, began to spend
money that they could not repay in the short or perceivable long
term. 1
24
On the creditor side, Korean banks as per the government's
post-1997-98 government initiatives began to offer extended lines
of credit in the forms of "vanilla loans" or credit cards to often
undeserving consumers ' 2 with little or no credit risk management
120 See Paul Krugman, What Happened to Asia? Paper presented at conference in
Japan (Jan. 1998), http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html.
121 Larkin, supra note 10.
122 See id.
123 See supra note 21. This in turn led to the currently worrisome high levels of
personal indebtedness and bankruptcies. This reality ran counter to the policy
assumption that the Confucian ideals of honor and discipline that many believe often
epitomize Korean society would prevent payment defaults. As it turned out, this
assumption was simply wrong.
124 In a 2003 survey by the Bank of Korea ("BOK") of nearly 780 bank customers,
credit card payments were the most popular form of payment method. Further, BOK
economist Ji-ho Lee noted that South Koreans avoided using cash advance services in an
effort to "control spending." See Jae-kyoung Kim, South Korea's Credit Card
Headache, BBC NEWS, Feb. 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2719929.stm.
125 One reason for this is that current Korean law does not readily allow creditors to
gain access to individual credit history; further, no truly comprehensive and centralized
credit-reporting agency currently exists in Korea similar to such agencies like TRW in
the United States. A very well publicized example of such problems on the creditor side
can be seen with LG Card, which is in the process of seeking reorganization or
bankruptcy.
LG Card, which has more than a million customers, is teetering on the brink of a
liquidity crisis and is expected to suffer a shortage of about 400 billion KRW in cash
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institutionalization by such credit-lending firms. 26  Similarly,
IDRA could easily overshoot its stated objectives and cause a
greater than expected drop in consumer spending 27 by Korean
consumers. This is the very same scenario as in the period
immediately following the '1997-98 Crisis and the very opposite
scenario following the government's 1999 push for consumers to
spend on credit.
The fourth broad risk is that sudden government intervention
into the credit card markets could deter investors in investments
within related, or even seemingly unrelated, domestic financial
markets. One example of this risk is the negative sentiment that
many global investors could have for bailouts of large credit card
companies, such as LG Credit Card. 28  Such actions could affect
the equities markets, bond markets (most notably high-profile
corporate debt), and the foreign exchange (FX) markets.129
alone. Government officials are fretting over the worst-case scenario, under which the
collapse of LG Card would have a domino effect on the entire financial market. See
Yon-se Kim Yon-se & Lee Chi-dong, End of LG Card Comes Nearer, KOREA TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2004.
126 South Korean household debt includes 449.4 trillion won of loans from banks
and other financial institutions and 25.2 trillion won in cash advances and credit card
spending, according to the central bank. Korea Posts Sharp Gain in Household Debt,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 9, 2005, at B2.
127 See Korean Credit Card Debt Hits New Record, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3464519.stm (noting that consumer spending is
"slowing" due to the nation's high credit card delinquency rate).
128 LG Card may likely post 360 billion KRW in net losses during the fourth quarter
of the year and its 2003 losses are estimated to total 1.38 trillion KRW. The securities
firm said will be difficult for LG Card to get back into the black next year, predicting it
will lose 411 billion KRW in 2004. The credit card company's restructuring package
will accelerate the reduction of operating expenses and huge loan write-off charges,
Goldman said, "The kind of practice will be harmful to its performance." See Analysts
Divided Over LG Cards Future, KOREA TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at 14.
Goldman Sachs also issued a negative investment opinion on LG Card.
"Creditors' demand that LG Group should yield its management rights in the card unit is
expanding uncertainties in the market," it said. Id. Morgan Stanley and Credit Suisse
First Boston (CSFB) have also downgraded their investment opinions on LG Card,
casting doubts over the card issuer's recovery. Standard & Poor's noted that LG Card
needs as much as 3 trillion won in fresh capital to normalize its management while its
creditor banks have promised only 2 trillion won in loans. But several domestic
securities firms, including Hyundai Securities, forecast that LG Card will be able to
make a profit from the third quarter of 2004. Id.
129 There are two additional considerations in the analysis. First, the broad risks
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IV. Conclusion
The negative externalities of the Korean credit card spending
binge and subsequent hangover have recently been met with
strong market interventionist counter-action by the Korean
government in the form of the IDRA. IDRA may benefit the
Korean economy through the massive influx of taxpayer capital
reallocated to bailout credit card debtors so as to avoid a rapidly-
downward spiraling financial infrastructure that could potentially
mirror the 1997-98 Crisis. The possible downside is that IDRA
may lead to moral hazard whereby consumers will be given an
incentive, or perhaps more aptly put, little disincentive to not
spend recklessly going forward. Instead, valuable taxpayer
revenue could be used for potentially more beneficial purposes if
allocated elsewhere.
Despite apparent merits of IDRA, the best solution to a
outlined above should not be assumed to be mutually exclusive. That is, one or more of
the broad risks outlined may occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. When
investor confidence weakens, a panic mentality can quickly engulf the markets as a
whole, and may seemingly override "rational" behavioral tendencies in the short run.
The second consideration is that the 1999 government policy to increase credit
card usage would have been an effective policy but for the existence of the critical
systemic problem of implementing proper credit risk management within South Korea's
credit-lending institutions. By implementing such risk management, the credit card
crisis would not have arisen to the level that exists today and the Act would have been
unnecessary, thus saving the taxpayers millions of Korean won and allowing the
government to spend such taxpayer revenue in more direct programs to spur the
economy. Even now, nearly any Korean resident can receive a credit card based on
minimal credit history verification. From the credit-lending institution's view, net
benefits outweigh costs based on the rationale that the potential upside (approximately
twenty percent interest) will outweigh the potential costs of payment default in the long
run. From the consumer's standpoint, the incentive to spend money that the individual
may or may not have in the short term outweighs the potential risk of not being able to
pay when payment is due. Further, with IDRA's passage, that such spending may be
subsidized in full or in part by the government.
Although IDRA arguably has its merits, one additional obstacle that may inhibit
its effectiveness is that too many programs similar to it currently exist in South Korea.
For example, in addition to IDRA, other debt relief programs such as Bad Bank, CCRS,
and Credit Bank, exist that overlap, in part, in terms of debtor relief protection. Such
overlapping coverage may lead to confusion on the part of individual debtors seeking a
solution to their credit card debt hangover. As a potential solution, legislative efforts
should be made to consolidate and wrap all related programs, including IDRA, under one
legislative umbrella. By doing this, clarity will be given to individual debtors who are
seeking debt relief, but are unaware of such programs, due to the myriad of programs
that already exist under varying mandates and auspices.
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situation in which clear signals of market failure do not yet exist is
not massive government intervention that will potentially trigger
moral hazard and thus more reckless debt spending. Rather,
market-interventionist legislation should not be implemented due
to the relatively greater downsides of spurring moral hazard
relative to the potential upsides of bailing out reckless individual
debtors. At the same time, strong efforts should be made to
implement sound long-term risk management so that lines of
credit are given only to those individuals who have a relatively
low probability of defaulting on payment. By doing this, South
Korea's financial infrastructure can become both more flexible
and crisis-resistant. This will signal to other global financial
players that market fundamentals in Korea are taken seriously and
are predominantly left unfettered, both in theory and in practice.
Such action may also minimize the probability of similar crises
occurring in the foreseeable future, which would benefit both the
South Korean and international financial markets.
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(Within 14 Days After
Application)
Objection to the IDRA
Credits
(2 weeks - 2 months
from the Execution Rule)
Conduct the Repayment
Plan
(Maximum 8 years)
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Immunity
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